American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic
Journals

Scholarship & Research

2015

Adventures in Nannydom: Reclaiming Collective Action for the
Public's Health
Lindsay Wiley
Wendy E. Parmet
Peter D. Jacobson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Adventures in Nannydom:
Reclaiming Collective Action
for the Public’s Health
Lindsay F. Wiley, Wendy E. Parmet, and Peter D. Jacobson

E

ach of us has written about the importance
of reframing the debate over public health
paternalism.1 Our individual explorations of
the many and varied paths forward from libertarian
“nanny state” objections to the “new public health”
have been intimately informed by collaboration.2 This
article represents a summary of our current thinking
— reflecting the ground gained through many fruitful
exchanges and charting future collaborative efforts.
Our starting point is that law is a vitally important
determinant of population health, and the interplay
among law, social norms, cultural beliefs, health behaviors, and healthy living conditions is complex. Antipaternalists’ efforts to limit the scope of public health
law to controlling only the proximal determinants of
infectious diseases are utterly unjustifiable in the face
of so much preventable death, disability, and disparity. Equally important, the anti-paternalism push
is deeply counter-majoritarian and undemocratic,
threatening to disable communities from undertaking
measures to improve their own well-being.
Although it may be tempting, we decline to dismiss
the “nanny state” slur solely on the grounds that “personal responsibility” and the purported “freedom to
choose” unhealthy products are smoke and mirrors
designed to hide the profit motive of industry groups
and their supporters. Certainly, regulated industries
have invested a great deal in framing the public’s
response to public health measures. But we cannot
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ignore the merits and potency of some of the criticism pointed at public health. At times, public health
has over-reached, failing to consider the full range
of concerns and values of the public it seeks to protect. We must, therefore, recognize that communities
may rightly weigh ends other than health more highly
than public health experts would, and also that the
anti-paternalistic rhetoric resonates with deeply held
beliefs about the relationship between the government and its citizens in a pluralistic society.
Even so, this rhetoric must be seen as part of a
broader attack by libertarian legal scholars and industry groups on regulation in general, and the new public health in particular.3 It is percolating into industrysponsored legal filings and even judicial opinions. It
threatens to erode the legal foundation for good public
health practice. To counteract these developments, we
must articulate a coherent, principled response that
reframes the debate on our own terms, rather than
remaining on the defensive. We must proactively
scan the horizon for the legal and political debates of
tomorrow, rather than being caught off guard.

Responses
In responding to allegations of nanny-statism, we
need to be clear about the weak legal basis for the libertarian objection. Otherwise, our counter-arguments
threaten to reify a vague, but growing sense among the
general public that interventions like the New York
City portion rule or the health insurance mandate are
being struck down by courts in the name of individual
rights.
Despite the objections of so-called constitutional
libertarians who seek to “recover” a constitution that
never was,4 it is, in fact, well established that states
have a legitimate interest in protecting the health
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and safety of the people, even from threats associated with individuals’ own choices and actions. 5
Anti-paternalism does not provide a constitutionally
enshrined, counter-majoritarian restraint on governmental authority. Likewise, despite a narrowing
of the scope of the federal government’s authority
under the Commerce Clause in NFIB v. Sebelius,6
it remains the case that the federal government can
use its enumerated constitutional powers, including
its authority to tax and spend, to protect health and
safety. In cases where the courts must apply strict
scrutiny because a fundamental right (such as freedom of speech) or suspect classification (e.g., race or

of all kinds. Many of the targeted regulations create
inconvenience or require the payment of small fines,
but do not involve significant restraints on individual
liberty. Others regulate the behavior of manufacturers
or sellers for the good of consumers, rather than regulating consumers for their own good. New York City’s
menu labeling and portion rules regulate how sellers
sell, not what patrons can eat or drink. In essence,
these laws are similar to prohibitions on the sale of
unwholesome food or dangerous drugs. While some
may disagree with the need for such laws, they are
no more paternalistic than laws that prevent people
from assaulting others. Those who are protected by

We need to recast public health law, both in perception and reality, from
regulations imposed by out-of-touch bureaucrats to the actions that
communities undertake to ensure the conditions in which they can be healthy.
Although expertise can and should play an important role in informing
public health protections, public health law is most legitimate and secure
when it reflects the concerns and values of affected populations, and emerges
from their engagement, as occurred when the gay community mobilized
around HIV in the 1980s and ‘90s, or when African-American and Latino
communities mobilize around the issue of access to healthy food. When
directed at such public health laws, the libertarian critique is exposed for what
it is: an attack on the liberty of communities to improve their own health.
religion) is implicated, a purely paternalistic governmental interest may not be sufficiently compelling
to justify infringement.7 But there is no fundamental
right to sell or purchase particular products or services in particular configurations.8
Even the recent New York Court of Appeals opinion invalidating the portion rule, which undoubtedly
contained a nod to the libertarian critique of public
health, did not reject the city’s authority to regulate
portion sizes. Instead, the court determined that the
legislature, not the health department, should make
the decision.9 Were such a rule to be adopted by a
legislative body, the philosophical anti-paternalism
argument would not be sufficient to justify a counter-majoritarian constraint on legislative action. We
should be careful to specify that the debate over public health paternalism is not about what government
may do, but rather what government should do.
Part of the difficulty in responding to anti-paternalism arises from the fact that the libertarian objection
does not confine itself to coercive paternalistic regulations. It is a constantly shifting attack on regulation
74

such laws could theoretically engage in self-help; the
fact that laws reduce their need to do so by regulating
those who would endanger them does not make the
laws unduly paternalistic.

Reframings
We need to recast public health law, both in perception and reality, from regulations imposed by out-oftouch bureaucrats to the actions that communities
undertake to ensure the conditions in which they can
be healthy. Although expertise can and should play
an important role in informing public health protections, public health law is most legitimate and secure
when it reflects the concerns and values of affected
populations, and emerges from their engagement, as
occurred when the gay community mobilized around
HIV in the 1980s and ‘90s, or when African-American
and Latino communities mobilize around the issue of
access to healthy food. When directed at such public health laws, the libertarian critique is exposed for
what it is: an attack on the liberty of communities to
improve their own health.
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Scanning the Horizon
In addition to responding to the libertarian objection
and reframing the debate over public health regulation, public health must be more proactive in identifying and immediately confronting legal and political
challenges to public health. These include the development of preemption, non-delegation, First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due Process doctrines
as barriers to commercial regulation, as well as the
development of progressive (and not merely libertarian) objections to public health regulation.
Civil liberties, including free speech, have intrinsic value for progressives. Additionally, they play an
important role in promoting public health. Indeed, we
should remember that public health advocates have
supported robust interpretations of the First Amendment in their battles against governmental limitations
on speech concerning HIV/AIDS or gun ownership.10
Even as we object to the use of civil liberties to protect
industry interests from regulation, we need to recognize that First Amendment, Equal Protection, and
Due Process claims are not trivial; sometimes they
are critical to securing health.11 We need to articulate
principles that are supportive of appropriate public
health regulations while also being respectful of constitutional protections and are firmly rooted in public
health’s democratic roots.
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